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This paper analyses the monetary transmission mechanism in a
monetary union with a segmented ﬁnancial market. Diﬀerences in the
households’ information sets imply that a money supply shock yields
permanently heterogeneous allocations across households. The distrib-
ution of liquidity is fundamental to this equilibrium. This distribution
is also important to understand the response of the macroeconomic
variables to a technology shock. In this case, a money supply rule
yields heterogeneous allocations between households, while an inter-
est rate peg undoes the portfolio friction, yielding the same allocation
across agents.
1 Introduction
During the last decade, there has been a growing interest on the study of
monetary policy in general equilibrium models. Lucas (1990) and Fuerst
(1992) showed that one way to model the monetary non-neutralities present
in the data is to take into account that agents are not all and/or always
participating in the ﬁnancial market. This may arise due to information
asymmetries or to the inability of agents to costlessly implement their de-
sired ﬁnancial ﬂows in all periods. Models with this segmentation in the
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1ﬁnancial markets easily generate a liquidity eﬀect after a monetary shock,
which has led to their popularity in the modelling of monetary economies
(see for example Christiano (1991), Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Pa-
padopoulou (2002)). These ”limited participation” models were primarily
developed to understand the monetary transmission mechanism and the dis-
tribution of liquidity in closed economies. The literature on open economy
limited participation models is thus rather scarce, with some exceptions be-
ing Shlagenhauf and Wrase (1995) and Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
In this paper, we extend the analysis of the monetary transmission mech-
anism to a two-country monetary union, where countries are diﬀerentiated
by the degree of portfolio rigidity of the households. In analyzing the impact
of monetary shocks, special emphasis is placed on the distribution of liquidity
between countries in the union. The emphasis on the wealth redistribution
eﬀects of monetary policy was already present in the early contribution of
Grossman and Weiss (1983) but was later downplayed due to generalised
adoption of the representative household construct of Lucas (1990). In the
latter each household consisted of a multi-member family who traded in dif-
ferent markets but which pooled resources and information at the end of the
period so that wealth distribution eﬀects did not emerge. More recently, Al-
varez, Atkeson and Edmond (2002) presented an inventory theoretic model
of money demand. Households are assumed to have the opportunity to
transfer funds to their bank accounts only once every N periods. In this
context, a monetary injection implies that agents trading in the ﬁnancial
market at that point in time will hold a disproportionate amount of money.
Since these agents have a low propensity to consume and hold a dispropor-
tionate amount of money, aggregate velocity decreases and prices respond
sluggishly to the monetary shock.
In the two-country monetary union model presented below, the simplic-
ity of the representative household construct is preserved by assuming that
households are heterogeneous between countries and not within each coun-
try. This heterogeneity is modelled by assuming that households have diﬀer-
ent information sets when making savings decisions, as in Christiano (1991).
This allows the analysis of issues related to the distribution of liquidity in
the monetary union. We ﬁnd that the real eﬀects of monetary policy depend
on the overall degree of portfolio rigidity. Further, there are heterogeneous
real eﬀects in each country due to the existence of heterogeneous portfolio
rigidities. In particular, a monetary shock leads to permanent trade eﬀects
and capital balance eﬀects.
This paper also studies the impact of technology shocks in each economy,
under an interest rate peg and a constant money growth rule. The interest
2rate peg undoes the portfolio friction and yields the fully-ﬂexible allocation,
since all agents behave as if they had ﬂexible portfolios. Under a money
growth rule the fully-ﬂexible allocation is not replicated and each country
has diﬀerent allocations, both in the short and the long run. Here, again, the
liquidity distribution in the union is crucial to understand the real eﬀects of
the technology shock.
The study of the impact of a single monetary policy in diﬀerent countries
of a monetary union is not only important for the positive analysis of the
monetary transmission mechanism but also to the normative analysis of the
optimal monetary policy. In this set-up, an interest rate peg replicates the
all-ﬂexible allocation irrespective of the degree of portfolio rigidity in the
union. Under a constant interest rate, the allocations after a technology
shock are thus independent of the degree of the underying friction. In a
companion paper, it is shown that the optimal policy in this set-up is in
general the Friedman rule. It follows that the optimal policy is independent
of the degree of portfolio rigidity, as in Adão, Correia and Teles (1999).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the two-
country economic environment, the optimal decisions of the agents and the
equilibrium of the model. Section 3 describes the parameterization and as-
sesses the quantitative impact of a monetary policy shock while Section 4
focuses on the importance of the liquidity distribution to the various out-
comes. In Section 5 the eﬀects of common technology shocks to the union
are analyzed under two rules: an interest rate peg and a constant money
growth rule. Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions and discusses areas
for future research.
2 A two-country monetary union model with a
segmented ﬁnancial market
2.1 Overview
The model follows Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and generalizes
it to a monetary union set-up. The monetary union comprises two countries,
A and B. The union is populated by a continuum of agents in the interval
[0,1].W ea s s u m et h a tt h es e g m e n t[0,n] corresponds to country A and the
segment (n,1] to country B. The economy consists of six sectors: the ﬁrms
in each country; the households in each country; the ﬁnancial intermediaries,
who are completely integrated in the monetary union; and a single monetary
authority. The behavior of each agent is described in the subsections below.
3To understand the mechanics of this model, it is crucial to describe
thoroughly the cash ﬂow in the economy. In the beginning of period t,
all the money in the economy is held by the households. Each country’s
representative household enters the ﬁnancial market and allocates her money
holdings between loans to the ﬁnancial market - remunerated at a gross
interest rate Rt - and money sent to the goods markets. It is assumed that
households from country A do not observe the contemporaneous shocks to
the economy before entering the ﬁnancial market, whilst households from
country B observe these shocks before making their consumption/savings
decisions.
After leaving the ﬁnancial market, the households participate in the
goods markets. They demand goods produced in both countries and face a
cash in advance, stating that all nominal consumption must be purchased
with cash. The households are also able to use their wage bill to ﬁnance
consumption.
There is no mobility of labor between countries. Each country’s repre-
sentative ﬁrm i thus hires domestic labor only. In order to pay in advance
the wage bill to the households, the ﬁrms have to borrow that amount from
the ﬁnancial intermediaries at a gross interest rate Rt.
At the end of the period, the households receive the dividends from the
ﬁrms and the dividends plus the loans (with interest) from the ﬁnancial
intermediaries.
The uncertainty in this economy comes from the monetary authority,
who is assumed to inject reserves to the system through a lump-sum transfer
to the ﬁnancial intermediaries. Later, the impact of technology shocks will
also be considered.
2.2 The representative households
All individuals consume goods produced in both countries. The preferences
of household j (where j ∈ [0,n] corresponds to the representative household
in country A, while j ∈ (n,1] corresponds to the representative household















where β is a discount factor, 1−N
j
t is leisure and Cj is an index of consump-












nn(1 − n)1−n (2)
In this expression, n corresponds to the size of country A,b o t hi nt e r m s
of population and in terms of the share on total consumption of the con-
sumption good produced in A.T h ei n d e xC
j
A corresponds to consumption
in country j of the continuum of goods produced in country A and C
j
B cor-
responds to consumption in country j of the continuum of goods produced
































where σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in
each country. Note that the elasticity of substitution between the indexes
CA and CB is equal to 1. There is no home-bias in consumption.































where pj(a) is the price of good a (which is only produced in A), sold in
country j. An analogous deﬁnition applies to pj(b).
Assuming there are no transportation costs between countries, prices
are set taking into account that the monetary union is a single market. It
follows that pA(a)=pB(a) and pB(b)=pA(b). Further, given the symmetric
structure of preferences, the purchasing power parity holds, implying PA =
PB.
Given a decision on Cj, the Cobb-Douglas total consumption index



















Cj. Moreover, we can also
1An analogous mnemonic applies to the prices of the goods.
5derive the demand of the diﬀerentiated good a, produced in country A and



























Note that the superscripts in the price indexes are redundant, since prices
are the same in both countries.
The households maximize utility subject to a cash in advance constraint
and an asset evolution equation. The problem of the representative house-






































t is the nominal wage, NA
t is aggregate labor, MA
t is the
beginning-of-period stock of money, LA
t are the loans to the ﬁnancial in-
termediaries and DA
t are the dividends from ﬁrms in country A,w h i c ha r e
distributed to the respective owners - country A’s households. The amount
RtXA
t corresponds to the proﬁts of the ﬁnancial intermediaries, which arise
due to the monetary injection Xt.S i n c e t h e ﬁnancial markets are com-
pletely integrated we assume that all agents have an equal share in the
ﬁnancial intermediaries’ capital. Thus, each household in the monetary
union receives an equal share of this proﬁt, i.e., in per capita terms we have
XA
t = XB
t = Xt. In terms of countries, each country will receive the ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries’ proﬁts in proportion to their relative size in the union.








B,t =( 1− n)PA
t CA
t (12)























Conditions (11) and (12) state that the nominal share of consumption
of the goods produced in each country is proportional to the relative size
of the countries. This is due to the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the con-
sumption bundles. Condition (13) states that the intratemporal marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is equal to the real
wage rate. Condition (14) is the intertemporal condition, equating the mar-
ginal utility of a unit of money lent to the ﬁnancial intermediary at time t
to the expected marginal utility of return from that deposit at time t +1 .
The expectation term in equation (14) is taken at time t − 1 due to the
assumption that country A’s households participate in the ﬁnancial market
prior to the realization of shocks. In contrast, we assume that country B’s
households observe the shocks before transacting in the ﬁnancial market.
This heterogeneity segments the ﬁnancial market and is the main subject of
study in this paper.
































2.3 The representative ﬁrms




1−α i = a,b
where yt(i) is the production of good i, s
j
t is a technology shock (which
can be common or country-speciﬁc) and nt(i) is labor employed by the ﬁrm
producing good i.T h eﬁrms in each economy hire domestic labor at a wage
rate W
j
t and need to borrow their wage bill from the ﬁnancial intermediaries
7at a rate of interest Rt. The problem is completely symmetric between all
households and ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r ys ont(a)=NA
t and nt(b)=NB
t .
The ﬁrms choose the price to maximize their proﬁts. In the case of
country A,w eh a v e :
Max πA
t = pt(a)yt(a) − WA
t NA
t − (Rt − 1)WA
t NA
t =
= pt(a)yt(a) − RtWA
t NA
t
Taking into account that the demand elasticity facing the ﬁrms’ products

















i.e., they set prices as a constant mark-up µ = σ
σ−1 over marginal costs. As
the elasticity of demand gets larger, the mark-up converges to 1,t h ec a s eo f
perfect competition.
The price-setting behaviour of the ﬁrms in country B is completely sym-
metric.
2.4 The ﬁnancial intermediaries
There is complete integration of the ﬁnancial markets. The supply of loans
corresponds to the sum of the monetary injection Xt with the loans made
by the households. The demand for loans comes from the ﬁrms and equals
the total wage bill. The loan market clearing condition is therefore:
nW A
t NA
t +( 1− n)WB
t NB
t = nLA
t +( 1− n)LB
t + Xt (20)
2.5 Other equilibrium conditions





t = Mt + Xt (21)
where Mt = nMH
t +( 1− n)MF
t is the union’s monetary aggregate.
The goods markets equilibria imply that overall consumption of each
type of good in both countries equals the respective production:
nCA
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Replacing equations (11) and (15) in equation (22), equations (12) and
(16) in (23), and using equation (21) yields the aggregate demand functions





















3 Response of the union to a monetary policy shock
3.1 Parameterization































These preferences are in the class of GHH preferences, which imply that there
are no wealth eﬀects in labor supply. Whenever relevant we will report the
impact of this assumption on the results.
Since we will be particularly interested in the distribution of liquidity in






By construction, we also have




The monetary authority is assumed to follow an autoregressive money
supply process, of the form
xt = ρxt−1 + ϕx,t
where ϕx,t has mean x and standard deviation σx,t.
9The parameters were assigned the following values (following closely
Christiano et al. (1998)): β =1 .03−.25; α =0 .36; µ =1 .3; χ =0 .6; φ =2 ;
x =0 .01; σx =0 .005; ρ =0 .5. Three features of this parameterization
may be highlighted. First, an AR(1) process with a degree of persistence of
0.5 was found by Christiano et al. (1998) to be a good statistical approxi-
mation for the response of M2 to monetary policy shocks in the US in the
period 1965Q3-1995Q2. Second, the mark-up is within the consensus of the
literature (Christiano et al. (1997) use a value of 1.2 and Christiano et al.
(1998) choose 1.4 instead). Third, the parameter χ =0 .6 implies, with our
GHH preferences, an intratemporal elasticity in labor supply of 1
χ =1 .7.
This may be considered high when looking at microeconomic studies but
low when looking at macro studies (see Domeij and Flodén (2001) for an
overview and a description of a downward bias in microeconometric studies
ignoring borrowing constraints).
We will study linear approximations to the solution of the model by log-
linearizing the equations around the deterministic steady-state, using the
undetermined coeﬃcients method presented in Christiano (2002). All the
nominal variables were scaled by Mt.
3.2 Analysis of the results
Figure (1) reproduces the response of the economy to a 0.5 p.p. shock
in the money supply growth path of the monetary union. The baseline
parametrization assumes that both countries are of the same size.
After a positive monetary shock we observe the following events. First,
the interest rate drops in the period of the shock (the liquidity eﬀect domi-
nates). In the subsequent quarters, the anticipated inﬂation eﬀect dominates
(the model has no endogenous propagation mechanism, so the liquidity ef-
fect lasts only 1 period). Second, the monetary union’s overall consumption
rises in the impact period. However, consumption rises in country B and
falls in country A. In subsequent periods, consumption is below steady state
in both countries. Third, the monetary union’s overall employment and real
wages rise in the impact period. The labor market equilibrium is the same in
both countries, due to the assumption of GHH preferences. Fourth, inﬂation
rises persistently after the shock. Fifth, the loans from country B’s house-
holds to the ﬁnancial intermediaries fall in the impact period and the money
sent to the goods market rises. Country A’s households do not change the
amount of money sent to the ﬁnancial or the goods market in the impact
period. Finally, the share of money in country A (θt)r i s e si nt h ei m p a c t
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Figure 1: Response of the economy to a monetary injection in period 6.
Countries are of the same size. Country A’s households have sticky portfolios
and Country B’s households have ﬂexible portfolios. The Figure shows the
percent deviations from steady state, except for the interest and inﬂation
rates, which are presented as annualised rates.
11To understand these events, it is useful to conduct some partial equi-
librium analysis, starting with the ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e t s ,m o v i n gt ot h el a b o r
markets and ending in the goods markets (this follows Christiano et al.
(1997)). We will ﬁrst focus on the n =0 .5 case and on the impact pe-
riod. Afterwards we will assess the impact of varying n. Finally, we will
analyze the distribution of liquidity in the union and its relation with the
intertemporal allocations.
3.2.1 The ﬁnancial market
Combining the loan market equilibrium condition (20) with the aggregate
cash-in-advance (21), we can write
nW A
t NA










t +( 1− n)LB
t + Xt
Mt + Xt
which can be simpliﬁed, using the price setting equation (19) in both coun-









This relation shows that the evolution of the interest rate is directly
linked to the evolution of the amount of money in the hands of the ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Knowing that LA
t does not respond contemporaneously to a
monetary shock (due to the portfolio rigidities), the existence of a liquidity
eﬀect will be determined, on the one hand, by the response of LB
t and, on
the other, by the relative size of the countries. In the absence of persistence
in the money supply process (i.e., without an increase in expected inﬂation),
the existence of a fraction of sticky households would be suﬃcient to gen-
erate a dominant liquidity eﬀect. The baseline results suggest that, even
with considerable persistence in the money supply process (ρ =0 .5), the
framework with equally-sized countries is suﬃcient to generate a dominant
liquidity eﬀect.
Compared with traditional limited participation models, the monetary
injection in this set-up is not only channelled through the ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries to the ﬁrms but also to the ﬂexible households. Relative to those
frameworks, the liquidity eﬀect is thus less pronounced here, since the ﬁrms
do not have to absorb all the liquidity injected by the monetary authority
in the system.
123.2.2 The labor markets
Since labor is immobile between countries, the labor markets are segmented.

















,for j = A,B (27)













,for j = A,B (28)
In the baseline parameterization, the monetary shock implies a reduction
in interest rates. Since the decrease in interest rates represents a decrease
in the ﬁrms’ intermediate costs, the demand for labor rises, ceteris paribus.
This occurs in both countries. Due to the assumption of GHH preferences,
the behavior of the supply schedule in the labor market is unchanged after
a monetary shock. Thus, both labor markets share the same equilibrium.
The overall eﬀects are an unambiguous increase of labor and of the real
wage in both countries, which occurs as long as the liquidity eﬀect dominates
the anticipated inﬂation eﬀect after a monetary injection3.
3.2.3 The goods market
The demand function for the good produced in country j is given by (recall











After a money injection the demand curve is shifted upwards. This
happens in both markets. The same occurs to the supply of goods. The
3When preferences have wealth eﬀects in labor supply, the diﬀerent behavior of the
C
j
t’s now correspond to diﬀerent movements of the labor supply curve. In this case, a
monetary policy shock implies the following. In country A, both the labor and the supply
curve shift rightwards, yielding an unambiguous increase in labor in country A and an
ambiguous change in the real wage. In country B the supply curve shifts leftwards and
the demand curve shifts rightwards yielding a decrease in labor in country B (for most
parameterizations) and an unambiguous increase in the real wage (when the liquidity eﬀect
dominates).
13overall eﬀects are thus an unambiguous increase in both quantities and prices
of each type of goods4.
An important result of these models is that proﬁts always rise after a
monetary policy shock. To see this, we can write the proﬁts of the repre-
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. Thus, proﬁts are positively related to money
injections. The increase in proﬁts after a monetary injection is in accordance
with the empirical evidence (see, in particular, Christiano et al. (1997)).
3.3 Impact of changing the size of each country
As expected, the size of the country A - which in this set-up corresponds
to the percentage of sticky households - has a very important impact in the
response of the monetary union’s variables to a money injection.
First, for small sizes of country A (n<0.25), the interest rate rises fol-
lowing a monetary injection. In this case, a vast majority of households in
the monetary union observes the monetary shock, so the anticipated inﬂa-
tion eﬀect dominates the liquidity eﬀect. Conversely, the larger the size of
country A, the larger the liquidity eﬀect.
Second, the behavior of LB
t i sa l s oaf u n c t i o no ft h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h e
countries. The larger the proportion of “sticky” households, the smaller
the decrease in total loans to the ﬁnancial intermediaries (Figure (2)). The
counterpart of this eﬀect is that the higher the size of A,t h es m a l l e rt h e
increase in the monetary union’s money sent to the goods markets.
Third, in the labor market, the higher the size of A, the higher the
upward shift5 in the demand curve (because the nominal interest rate is
progressively lower) [see Figure (2)]. This implies that the larger the size of
the “sticky” country A, the larger the expansion (or the smaller the decrease,
for n<0.25) in the real wage and the quantity of labor in equilibrium.
In the goods markets, a higher n implies a larger shift to the right of the
supply curve with no impact on the demand curve (Figure (3)). A higher n is
thus associated with a smaller increase in the price of the goods produced in
both countries, and consequently with a smaller increase in the overall price
4In case of preferences with wealth eﬀects in labor supply, the behavior of the goods
supply curve is diﬀe r e n ti ne a c hm a r k e t . T h ed e m a n dc u r v ei ss h i f t e du p w a r d si nb o t h
markets. For the baseline calibration, there is a rise in PB higher than in PA,ar i s ei ny
A
and a fall in y
B.
5For n<0.25,t h eh i g h e rn, the smaller the downward shift in the demand curve.
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Figure 2: Equilibria in the ﬁnancial and labor markets in the period of the
shock
indexes in both countries. Thus the stickiness in portfolios partly translates
in price stickiness after a monetary shock.
4 The distribution of liquidity in the monetary
union
The analysis of the distribution of liquidity in the union is crucial to assess
the allocations following a monetary policy shock. The distribution of liq-






Mt , i.e., the per capita money holdings in country i relative to the mone-
tary union’s per capita holdings and (b) the evolution of the money sent by
households to the goods market (”cash”).
The following analysis will be rooted in the equation describing the evo-
lution of the household’s assets. After normalizing the variables in equation
(10) by Mt and denoting them with lower cases, the asset evolution equation
































Above the state variable θt = n
MA
t










n (1 + xt), and recalling that the monetary injec-
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Figure 3: Equilibria in the goods markets in the period of the shock





t (1 − Rt)+
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How is liquidity channelled in the monetary union in the period of the
shock when countries are of the same size (see Figure (4))?
The monetary injection is ﬁrst absorbed by the ﬁnancial intermediaries,
adding to the supply of funds in the ﬁnancial market. In this market, the
ﬂexible households contemporaneously adjust their decisions to the new liq-
uidity conditions, while the sticky households do not. Thus, the ﬂexible
households reduce their supply of funds to the ﬁnancial market, and chan-
n e lal a r g e ra m o u n to ff u n d st ot h eg o o d sm a r k e t s .T h i so c c u r sb e c a u s et h e
ﬂexible households perceive that prices will rise with the monetary injection
and accordingly send more funds to the goods markets. Meanwhile, since
the sticky households made their decisions before observing the monetary
shock, they continue to behave as if the shock had not occurred. Thus, there
is an increase in liquidity for transactions in country B relative to country
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Figure 4: Response of the economy to a monetary injection in period 6.
Countries are of the same size. Country A’s households have sticky portfolios
and Country B’s households have ﬂexible portfolios. The Figure shows the
percent deviations from steady state.
17A. In parallel, both countries’ ﬁrms also absorb the extra liquidity injected
by the monetary authority and increase their wage bill. This latter eﬀect
occurs since the interest rate drops on impact.
At the end of the period, all money returns to the households. From
equation (30) it is straightforward to see that the evolution of θt will depend
on the proﬁts of each country’s ﬁrms (which are equal due to the symmetry
of technology and preferences in both countries) and on the returns from the
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Since country A’s households send relatively more
money to the ﬁnancial markets in the period of the shock, the return of











where t i st h ep e r i o do ft h es h o c k .
In the periods after the shock, the intertemporal condition holds equally
for both country’s households. Thus the path of LA is parallel to the path of
LB (they are not equal since they diverge in the period of the shock). This
allows households A to ﬁnance a higher level of consumption (relative to B),
through the higher returns on the loans made to the ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Since the households wish to smooth their consumption over time, this eﬀect
is permanent. Thus, country A’s households will send a permanently higher
level of loans to the ﬁnancial market and a permanently higher level of
money to the goods markets relative to country B’s households.
4.1 The trade balance and the consumption decisions over
time
From the cash-in-advance conditions, it is straightforward to see that the
contrasting evolution in CA
t and CB




6. By assumption LA
t does not react to the mone-
tary injection, while LB
t does. In an all-ﬂexible world, the households would
react to a money injection by decreasing their loans to the ﬁnancial interme-
diaries (thus replicating the equilibrium without the central bank’s surprise
injection) and increasing the money sent to the goods market. This is the
qualitative response of country B’s households. Thus, in the period of the
shock the consumption in country B increases more than the consumption































































always holds. From the price-setting equations of ﬁrms








t . These con-










18in country A (for n =0 .5, the consumption in country B increases 0.29%,
while consumption in country A actually decreases 0.05%).
How is the partition of CA
t in CA
A,t and CA




B,t? Here, two forces are at work: ﬁrst, the evolution of the overall con-
sumption basket in each country; second, the evolution of the relative price
Pi
i,j
Pi . With common shocks and GHH preferences, the relative price between
g o o d si sa l w a y se q u a lt o1 and the prices of each type of good are equal
to the overall price level in both countries. Thus the consumption by each
country’s households of each type of good is directly related to the aggregate
consumption in each country. In the period of the shock, and for n =0 .5,
this implies that CA
A,t and CA
B,t will decrease and that CB
A,t and CB
B,t will
increase. However, it was already shown that the production (and thus con-
sumption in equilibrium) of both types of goods increases in the period of
the shock. It follows necessarily that n
¯ ¯ ¯∆−CA
A,t
¯ ¯ ¯ < (1 − n)
¯ ¯ ¯∆+CB
A,t













B,t, thus improves in the period of the shock. This reﬂects the in-
c r e a s e dd e m a n do f( d o m e s t i ca n df o r e i g n )g o o d sb yc o u n t r yB’s households
and the decrease in demand of (domestic and foreign) goods by country A’s
households. This result contrasts with the conclusions of standard open-
economy models using Cobb-Douglas consumption indexes and zero initial
non-monetary wealth (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998) and Benigno (2001)).
In these models, the trade balance is always zero and consumption in both
c o u n t r i e si sa l w a y se q u a l ,r e ﬂecting total consumption insurance between
countries.
The diﬀerent result found in this model is rooted in the diﬀerent timing
assumptions of the intertemporal conditions. Without segmentation in the
ﬁnancial markets, the intertemporal conditions in both countries would im-








=0 . A positive level of assets at time t held











, violating the above condition.
Without limited participation of some of the households, consumption must
always be the same between countries.







from zero, since one of the intertemporal conditions only holds in expected
19value. Consequently, consumption between agents can diﬀer in the period
of the shock and the trade balance can be diﬀerent from zero.
To understand the evolution of the trade balance after the shock, it is
important to note that in the period of the shock the trade balance surplus in
country A is associated with an increase in loans to ﬁnancial intermediaries
greater than the observed in country B7. As shown in the last subsection,
country A’s households are thus able to ﬁnance a higher stream of consump-
tion in the following periods. Since they wish to smooth consumption over
time, their consumption/savings decisions imply that, relative to country
B, they permanently lend more to the ﬁnancial intermediaries and perma-
nently consume more (by also sending more money to the goods markets).
T h eh i g h e rs t r e a mo fl o a n st ot h eﬁnancial intermediaries allows country
A’s households to ﬁnance a permanent trade deﬁcit arising from the higher
l e v e lo fc o n s u m p t i o n .T h i sp a t t e r nc a nb eo b s e r v e di nF i g u r e( 5 ) .
5 Impact of technology shocks in the monetary
union
In the previous section the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock in the context
of a monetary union with heterogeneous portfolio rigidities were analysed.
It was concluded that monetary policy shocks had an impact not only on the
allocations of the union’s agents as a whole, but also the relative allocations
between agents. This heterogeneity allocation was rooted in the distribution
of liquidity in the monetary union.
However, this analysis of monetary policy shocks is not an appropriate
description of how central banks operate around the world. Central banks do
not usually randomize the money supply, surprising the agents with liquidity
injections/absorptions. On the contrary, monetary policy usually focuses its
attention on fundamental shocks hitting the economy. Consequently this
section analyses the impact common technology shocks in the monetary
union. Two simple monetary policy rules will be compared: an interest rate
peg and a money growth peg8.
7In this set up, there is international lending and borrowing, so the current account
in both countries also changes after the monetary shock. However, since there is perfect
i n t e g r a t i o ni nt h eﬁnancial markets, the nationality of the ﬁnancial intermediaries is not
deﬁned. Thus, the evolution of the current account is indeterminate. The trade balance,
in contrast, is pinned down.
8The preferences of the consumer are assumed to be GHH. The case of preferences
with wealth eﬀects in labor supply is available upon request.
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Figure 5: Response of the economy to a monetary injection in period 6.
Countries are of the same size. Country A’s households have sticky portfolios
and Country B’s households have ﬂexible portfolios. The Figure shows the






Figure 6: Financial market with money growth rule in the period of the
shock
As a ﬁrst step in the analysis, it is important to assess the determinacy
of equilibrium under each rule. As shown in Appendix A the nominal and
real allocations are determinate under a money growth rule. However, the
allocations diﬀe rb e t w e e nb o t hc o u n t r i e sa f t e rat e c h n o l o g ys h o c k .I nc o n -
trast, an interest rate peg yields nominal indeterminacy. There is however
real determinacy in the model and the allocations are the same between
both countries.
5.1 Money-growth rule
Here the focus is on the actual response of the economies to a technology
shock. Three benchmark cases are analysed: the case where all households
are ﬂexible; the case where only country A’s households are sticky and both
countries are of the same size; and the case where all households are sticky.
The calibration is the same used in the analysis of the money shock.
The technology shock is assumed to have the following distribution: st =
exp(τt), where τt =0 .5τt−1 + ετ,t and ετ,t has mean zero and standard
deviation 0.01.
A positive technology shock has important eﬀects in all markets. To
analyze the various cases, it is important to ﬁrst depict the dynamics of
the credit market in the monetary union (Figure (6)). Recall that the loan
supply is given by LoanS = nLA
t +(1−n)LB
t +Xt and that the loan demand




t . By equation
(39) the loan demand can also be expressed as LoanD =
(1+xt)(1−α)
µRt
22With a money growth rule, the change in the supply of loans is a function
of the behavior of the private sector. In the case when all households have
sticky portfolios, the supply curve is vertical in the period of the shock. In
this case the share of funds with the ﬁnancial intermediaries is ﬁxed and Rt
does not change (see equation (39)). The allocation is thus similar to the
case of an interest rate rule.
When some (or all) of the households are ﬂexible, the supply curve slopes
upwards. In this case, after a technology shock, the ﬂexible agents increase
their savings for the next period (i.e., their loans to the ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries), and this shifts the supply curve rightwards. This implies, for n<1,
a decrease in interest rates in the period of the shock, a decrease in total
money sent to the goods markets and an increase in loans (all relative to the
steady state). A higher fraction of ﬂexible agents in the union corresponds
to a ﬂatter supply curve in the credit market. This implies that the higher
the number of ﬂexible households, the greater the decrease in the interest
rate.
In the labor market, and for n<1, a positive technology shock increases
the demand for labor by ﬁrms (since the interest rate decreases) indirectly
raising the demand for loans (associated with a potentially higher wage
bill). Thus, equilibrium labor and real wages increase in the period of the
shock. In the goods markets, the demand curve is shifted to the left and the
supply curve is shifted to the right (the substitution eﬀect dominates the
non-existent wealth eﬀect). This implies an unambiguous decrease in prices
and an increase in total output.
When the degree of rigidity varies between countries, their economies be-
have diﬀerently (Figure (7)). Flexible agents adjust their savings decisions
in the period of the shock, increasing their loans to the ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries and decreasing the money sent to the goods market, which is justiﬁed
since prices fall and households wish to smooth consumption. Sticky agents
continue to behave as if the shock had not occurred. This implies that in
the period of the shock consumption of the sticky households A is higher
relative to country B’s households. These events trigger a dynamic process
analogous to the one described for a monetary policy shock. This process
includes the following elements: a permanent lower share of money held by
country A’s households; a permanent lower level of loans sent by country A’s
households to the ﬁnancial intermediaries; a permanent lower level of money
sent by country A’s households to the goods markets; and, a trade deﬁcit in
country A in the period of the shock folowed by a permanent trade surplus
thereafter. The heterogeneity in the degree of stickiness thus translates in
heterogeneous allocations when a money growth rule is followed.
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Figure 7: Response of the economy to a common technology shock in period
6. The monetary authority follows a constant money growth path. Coun-
tries are of the same size. Country A’s households have sticky portfolios
and Country B’s households have ﬂexible portfolios. The Figure shows the
percent deviations from steady state, except for the interest and inﬂation
rates, which are presented as annualised rates.
24Two elements with an important impact on the quantitative results are
the assumptions of a mark-up equal to 1.3 and the GHH preferences of the
households. The smaller the mark-up, the smaller the impact of a monetary
injection in the interest rate (i.e., the ﬂatter the demand curve in the loan
market). The assumption of GHH preferences impacts on the equilibrium
through its eﬀect on the labor market dynamics. With preferences that allow
f o rw e a l t he ﬀects in labor supply, the decrease in interest rates following a
monetary injection would imply a shift to the left of the supply curve in
the labor market, mitigating the expansionary eﬀects of the fall in interest
rates.
5.2 Interest rate peg
With an interest rate peg, the monetary authority stands ready to in-
ject/absorb the amount of reserves needed to support the current interest
rate, implying an horizontal supply curve at the targeted interest rate in
the ﬁnancial market. This also implies that the share of the money stock










By deﬁnition, country A’s households do not revise the loans sent to the
ﬁnancial intermediaries since their portfolios are sticky in the period of the
shock. In country B, even though portfolios are ﬂexible, agents do not have
any incentive to change lB
t , since they know that ultimately the central bank
will always counter their decisions to ensure the interest rate peg. Appendix
A shows that the allocation under an interest rate rule is the same in both
countries. This implies that country B’s households behave similarly to
country A’s households and choose lB
t = lA
t . Since in the period of the
shock the loans from households do not change from their steady state path,
neither do the monetary authority’s injections. This occurs irrespective of
the size of each country. Thus the supply of loans is ﬁxed and the wage bill
is also unchanged in the period of the shock.
When all agents are ﬂexible, the nominal variables are indeterminate
with an interest rate rule. However, when some of the agents have sticky
portfolios, these nominal variables are pinned down in the period of the
shock, and their path is equal in both countries. In the periods following
the shock, there is nominal indeterminacy.
In all cases, there is no heterogeneity in the real allocation between
countries. This allocation is identical to the case where portfolios are ﬂexible
25All flexible 50% flexible All sticky All flexible 50% flexible All sticky
Money growth in the monetary union Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Annualised interest rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.19 -1.48 0.00
Consumption in country A 1.67% 1.67% 1.67% 2.17% 2.07% 1.67%
Consumption in country B 1.67% 1.67% 1.67% 2.17% 1.73% 1.67%
Consumption in the monetary union 1.67% 1.67% 1.67% 2.17% 1.90% 1.67%
Labor in country A 1.04% 1.04% 1.04% 1.83% 1.40% 1.04%
Labor in country B 1.04% 1.04% 1.04% 1.83% 1.40% 1.04%
Labor in the monetary union 1.04% 1.04% 1.04% 1.83% 1.40% 1.04%
Real wage in country A 0.63% 0.63% 0.63% 1.10% 0.84% 0.63%
Real wage in country B 0.63% 0.63% 0.63% 1.10% 0.84% 0.63%
Inflation in country A Ind. -6.71 -6.71 -8.65 -7.61 -6.71
Inflation in country B Ind. -6.71 -6.71 -8.65 -7.61 -6.71
Real interest rate in country A Ind. 6.71 6.71 5.46 6.13 6.71
Real interest rate in country B Ind. 6.71 6.71 5.46 6.13 6.71
Money growth in country A Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 0.83% 1.00%
Money growth in country B Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.17% 1.00%
Change in money sent to the goods market in country A Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 0.29% 1.00% 1.00%
Change in money sent to the goods market in country B Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 0.29% 0.34% 1.00%
Change in money sent to the goods market in the union Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 0.29% 0.67% 1.00%
Change in loans to financial intermediaries by country A Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 1.77% 1.00% 1.00%
Change in loans to financial intermediaries by country B Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 1.77% 1.71% 1.00%
Change in loans in the union Ind. 1.00% 1.00% 1.77% 1.36% 1.00%
Note 1: Percent deviations from steady state except for monetary aggregates (absolute changes) and interest and inflation rates (annualised rates)
Note 2: In the case of an interest rate rule with a fraction of sticky agents, there is only nominal determinacy in the period of the shock
Interest rate peg Money growth rule
Figure 8: Summary of responses in the impact period to a common technol-
ogy shock
for all the union’s households.
Figure (8) compares the response of each country to a common tech-
nology shock, when countries vary in size and have heterogeneous portfolio
rigidities. Two main conclusions may be highlighted: ﬁrst, the allocation in
both countries is the same under an interest rate rule and diﬀers under a
money growth rule; second, the allocation is more volatile under a money
growth rule.
6 Concluding remarks
With the introduction of the euro the study of the monetary transmission
mechanism in a monetary union has been a growing subject of interest.
This paper analyzed the transmission of monetary shocks in a monetary
union with heterogeneous portfolio rigidities and the response of the union’s
economies to technology shocks under some simple policy rules.
The monetary union was modelled as a standard two-country model in
26which countries were characterized by distinct degrees of portfolio rigidity.
As an extreme, it was assumed that in each country households faced either
complete portfolio rigidity (with the consumption/savings decision taken be-
fore the shocks hit the economy) or complete portfolio ﬂexibility. It was also
assumed that labor markets were separated, whereas the ﬁnancial markets
were completely integrated.
A monetary policy shock in this monetary union yields standard results
in terms of the union’s aggregates but implies heterogeneous responses of
each country’s macroeconomic variables. Both the union and each country’s
allocations are closely related to the distribution of liquidity in the union.
The degree and heterogeneity of portfolio rigidities in a monetary union
is thus an important friction to understand the impact of monetary shocks,
not only on the overall aggregates, but also on distributive outcomes between
agents of the economy.
The distribution of liquidity between countries is also crucial to under-
stand the response of the union to common technology shocks when the
monetary authority follows one of two simple policy rules: an interest rate
peg or a money growth peg. The main conclusions of this analysis were the
following. First, an interest rate peg undoes the portfolio rigidities in the
union, replicating the ﬂexible-portfolio allocation. The allocation in each
country is the same. In the period of the shock, the nominal aggregates are
also pinned down. These results hold irrespective of the functional form of
the preferences of the households.
Second, a constant money growth rule yields nominal determinacy, but
implies diﬀerent allocations in each country, since the saving/consumption
decision diﬀers with the degree of portfolio rigidity. Further, the union’s
ﬂexible-portfolio allocation is not replicated. In terms of the quantitative
response to technology shocks, the distribution of liquidity within the union
is again crucial in determining the real and nominal variables of the union
and of each country.
Since all shocks in the monetary union yield permanent eﬀects in the dis-
tribution of liquidity, it is straightforward to conclude that this distribution
follows a random walk. It would be interesting to assess the empirical valid-
ity of this result. Another interesting line of investigation would be the study
of current operating procedures by the ECB, in particular in what concerns
the distribution of liquidity throughout the euro area after the reﬁnancing
operations conducted by the ECB. Finally, an extension of this work lies
in the analysis of the optimal monetary policy in the union. In particular
it would be interesting to assess whether the existence of diﬀerences in the
underlying frictions aﬀects the optimal policy prescription.
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A Appendix A: Analysis of determinacy of equi-
librium under a money growth rule and an in-
terest rate peg
To analyse the determinacy of equilibrium it is useful to start by recalling
the equilibrium conditions of the economy. These are the following:




















































• the two goods market equilibrium conditions
nCA









B,t +( 1− n)CB







30• the loan market condition
nwA
t NA
t +( 1− n)wB
t NB
t = nlA
t +( 1− n)lB
t + xt

























































It is also useful to compute the relative prices between both countries
pA,t


















































31This equation implies that there is complete nominal output insurance
in the union.
The computation of CA
t and CB
t is implemented through the goods























































With GHH preferences the intratemporal condition for the representative










which does not depend on C
j
t (there are no wealth eﬀects in labor supply).





















Since, by construction pA
t = pB
t (the aggregate price level is the same in
both countries, due to the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the consumption




A.1 Money growth rule





1+xt is a function of lA
t and lB
t only. Note that the loans mar-


















































































































































and consequently the real allocation depends on the distribution of liquidity









































































where we used the fact that, as shown in equation (46), pA
t = pB








Note, ﬁnally, that θt is a predetermined variable since it represents the
share of money of country A’s households at the beginning of the period.
Let Φt be the number of states in period t. Under a money growth
r u l e( i . e . ,f o rac e r t a i np a t ho fxt), the 8Φt equations (53) to (60) deter-
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, there is also no nominal indeterminacy for a cer-
tain path of xt.
33However, lA
t and lB
t diﬀer in the period of the shock and, consequently,
the real allocations in both countries diﬀe r . T h i si m p l i e st h a tam o n e y
growth rule does not replicate the all-ﬂexible portfolios equilibrium, where
the allocations in both countries are the same.
A.2 Interest rate peg
































































































































With an interest rate peg, the 6Φt equations (61) to (66) uniquely de-














. There is a mapping
between the interest rate and the real allocation.







rules. Further, by equation (52) we already know that NA
t = NB
t (under
both rules). We now formally show that CA
t = CB
t .

























34We ﬁrst focus on country A’s households (we will drop the upperscript in
the labor and wage variables since they are equal in both countries). Using




t ,( 3 2 )c a n
be rewritten as
nlA






nwtNt +( 1− n)wtNt =
(1 + xt)(1 − α)
µRt
wtNt =
(1 + xt)(1 − α)
µRt
(68)
Using (46) and (68), and assuming a common technology shock st,t h e























































This expression can be further simplifyed by noting that the ﬁrst order
conditions of the ﬁrms and the intratemporal conditions imply (since pA,t =





























































By the equilibrium conditions in the goods markets (see (48)), we know
that
nCA
t +( 1− n)CB
t = st (Nt)
1−α (74)
We also know by (71) that the reponse of labor is the same in both countries
and independent of whether the respective households have ﬂexible or sticky
portfolios. Thus the right hand side is independent of the fraction of sticky
households n. Equations (72) and (73) show that CA
t and CB
t may only
diﬀer through diﬀerent lA
t and lB
t .B u ts i n c elA
t does not react to the shock,
this implies, by (74), that the response of CA
t and CB
t is the same. It also
implies that the ﬂexible agents do not have any incentive to change their
loans to the ﬁnancial intermediaries. The real allocation is thus the same
in both countries and independent of n. This allocation is the all-ﬂexible
portfolios allocation.
The monetary injections that support the interest rate peg are
1+xt =
µRt(1 − nlA
t − (1 − n)lB
t )
µRt − (1 − α)
Since the ﬂexible households behave as if they were sticky, lA
t and lB
t do not
move in the period of the shock. With an interest rate peg xt is independent
of the technology shocks in the period of the shock.
Concerning the nominal determinacy of the interest rate peg, the two
cash-in-advance conditions, the two intertemporal conditions and the loan





t and xt. Thus there is nominal indeterminacy with an interest rate
rule. A lower l
j
t corresponds to a higher xt and a higher p
j
t, all supporting
the same real allocation. Note, however, that this nominal indeterminacy
does not arise in the period of the shock.
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